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This paper examines the concept of inclusive growth, compares and contrasts it with 
related  concepts  such  as  pro-poor  growth  and  equitable  growth,  and  analyses  the  recent 
experience of South Asia through the lens of this concept. A common experience of the region 
is that spells of rapid growth have been marked by accelerated poverty reduction on the one 
hand  rising  income  inequality  on  the  other.  The  contrasting  movements  in  poverty  and 
inequality  render  intriguing  the  question  of  whether  South  Asia  has  experienced  inclusive 
growth or not. The reduction in poverty suggests inclusiveness, while the rise in inequality 
suggests otherwise. The implication is that the growth process has been inclusive in some 
dimensions but not in others. Closer examination shows that in each country of the region 
horizontal equity (between groups) has been served better than vertical equity (within groups). 
Thus,  while  the  growth  process  has  opened  up  plentiful  opportunities  for  most  groups  of 
people  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  growth,  thereby  making  poverty  reduction  possible  at  an 
accelerated  pace,  in  every  group  some  individuals  have  failed  to  link  up  with  the  growth 
process,  thereby  exacerbating  inequality.  The  problem  was  that  within  each  group  some 
individuals lacked the skills and endowments required to integrate with the growth process. 
Improving the ‘integrability’ of these people is an essential demand of inclusive growth.   
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I.  THE IDEA OF INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
The  concept  of  development  has  evolved  a  long  way  since  the  times  when  the 
demands  of  growth  reigned  supreme.  In  Amartya  Sen’s  powerful  new  formulation, 
development has come to be seen as the expansion of human freedoms, encompassing all 
kinds of freedom—economic, social and political—and embracing all segments of the society, 
not just a privileged few [Sen (1999)]. In the course of this evolution, growth has not become 
redundant, however. Economic growth, in the sense of expansion of material production, is 
still essential to support the expansion of the freedoms that we all value. What has changed is 
a growing recognition that what matters for freedoms is not just the rate of growth but also the 
nature of the growth process. The same rate of growth may be achieved through different 
growth  processes,  each  involving  a distinct configuration  of  the  structure  of  production, 
structure of employment, and distribution of income and assets among the population, leading 
to very different levels of achievement of freedoms. For widespread enjoyment of freedoms to 
be possible, the growth process must be inclusive in nature. In other words, the structures of 
production and employment that a growth process generates must be of a nature that offers 
opportunities to all segments of the society to benefit from economic expansion. Widespread 
expansion of opportunities is the demand of inclusive growth.  
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This transformation in development thinking, shifting the emphasis from the demands 
of  growth  to  the  demands  of  inclusive  growth,  neatly  parallels  Mahbub  Ul  Haq’s  own 
intellectual  journey  during  his  illustrious  career.  Indeed,  he  was  one  of  those  visionary 
intellectuals who were at the very forefront of this transformation. From being one of the most 
articulate champions of ‘growthmanship’ in his early life, Mahbub Ul Haq became one of the 
most passionate advocates of inclusive growth in his mature life. The language he used may 
have been different, but the idea of human development with which Mahbub Ul Haq’s name 
has become inextricably linked, is precisely what inspires the call for inclusive growth. When 
a growth process ensures widespread human development—defined broadly as the expansion 
of freedoms that human beings have reason to value—it is then that growth can be said to be 
inclusive. It is entirely appropriate that a lecture devoted to the memory of Mahbub Ul Haq 
should examine the conditions of inclusive growth, especially for South Asia, a region whose 
well-being was always close to his heart. 
Before proceeding further, however, a bit of conceptual clarification may be in 
order. In particular, it is necessary to appreciate both the similarities and differences of 
the concept of inclusive growth vis-à-vis some closely related concepts. Sometimes the 
idea of inclusive growth is identified with pro-poor growth, sometimes with equitable 
growth, and sometimes with both by conflating the ideas of pro-poorness and equity into 
one and the same concept. Yet, neither the concept of pro-poorness, nor the concept of 
equity, nor a conflation of the two fully captures the idea of inclusive growth. One could 
argue, quite rightly, that being pro-poor in some sense is a necessary condition for growth 
to be inclusive, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. For, it is conceivable that while a 
growth process is biased in favour of the poor in general, there could exist some subset of 
the poor—defined by various attributes such as religion, ethnicity, location, etc.—who 
are being systematically excluded from enjoying the benefits of growth. Growth cannot 
be said to be inclusive in this case. 
One could also argue, again quite rightly, that equity is an essential attribute of 
inclusive growth, and yet whether a particular growth process is inclusive or not may not 
always be obvious by looking solely at the equity outcome, especially in the short run. If 
inclusive  growth  is  understood  as  widespread  expansion  of  opportunities  to  enhance 
freedoms, it must also be recognised that spreading of opportunities is itself a process that 
occurs  over  a  period  of  time.  In  the  early  stage  of  this  process,  the  expansion  of 
opportunities may not be as widespread as one would like, thus giving the appearance of 
non-inclusive  growth  in  the  short-term,  and  yet  the  process  could  contain  attributes 
favouring  convergence  towards  a  more  inclusive  outcome  over  the  longer  term.  The 
inclusiveness of growth must, therefore, be judged by longer term dynamic of the growth 
process rather than by its short-term distributional outcome. 
Thus, while the idea of inclusive growth must contain the properties of both pro-
poorness and equity of the growth process, it cannot be defined entirely in terms of the 
latter two concepts. Inclusive growth refers to the broader idea of a growth process that 
ensures widespread expansion of freedoms for all segments of the society over a period 
of time. All this is, admittedly, rather abstract so far. In this lecture, I shall try to add 
some concreteness to these abstract ideas by examining the recent experience of South 
Asia.
1 I shall begin by reviewing the recent record of growth, inequality and poverty in  
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the region and then try to interpret this record in the light of the idea of inclusive growth. 
In the process, I shall try to offer some remarks as to where the focus of policies ought to 
lie if inclusive growth is to be ensured in the region.  
II. THE RECENT RECORD OF GROWTH, INEQUALITY  
AND POVERTY IN SOUTH ASIA 
All countries of South Asia have enjoyed respectable rates of growth during 
the last quarter century. Even though the region’s growth performance during this 
period has been nowhere as spectacular as in East and South-East Asia, it has been 
far better than in most other parts of the developing world and, more importantly, 
much  better  than  in  its  own  past.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  1,  compared  to  the 
1970s, every country of the region has enjoyed faster rate of growth since the 1980s. 
The ride has not been entirely smooth, though, as Pakistan faced a serious setback in 
the 1990s and Sri Lanka has done so in the present decade, but on the whole the 
quarter  century  since  1980  has  witnessed  a  considerable  acceleration  of  growth 
compared to the 1970s. In terms of per capita GDP growth, the acceleration has been 
from 0.6 percent per annum to 3.8 percent in India, from 1.5 percent to 2.7 percent in 
Pakistan, from 1.7 percent to 2.8 percent in Bangladesh, and from 2.4 percent to 3.2 
percent in Sri Lanka. To a significant extent, this growth acceleration has happened 
as a consequence of a series of liberalising reforms that the countries of the region 
undertook  at  various  times  in  the  recent  past,  but  other  factors  such  as  higher 
agricultural productivity,  increased flow  of workers’ remittances from abroad, and 
favourable external circumstances have also played a role.
2  
Table 1 
Growth of GDP in South Asia: 1971– 2005  
1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-2000  2001-2005  1981-2005 
India      
  GDP  2.93  5.89  5.56  5.94  5.77 
  Population   2.30  2.16  1.99  1.74  2.01 
  Per capita GDP  0.63  3.74  3.57  4.20  3.76 
Pakistan      
  GDP  4.66  6.12  4.41  5.25  5.26 
  Population   3.14  2.75  2.50  2.22  2.55 
  Per capita GDP  1.51  3.38  1.91  3.02  2.72 
Bangladesh      
  GDP   3.79  3.73  4.84  5.43  4.52 
  Population   2.40  2.08  1.67  1.35  1.77 
  Per capita GDP  1.65  1.67  3.17  4.08  2.75 
Sri Lanka      
  GDP  4.05  4.27  5.21  3.98  4.59 
  Population   1.66  1.48  1.28  1.27  1.35 
  Per capita GDP  2.39  2.79  3.93  2.71  3.23 
Source: Calculated by the author from national and international sources.  
2I have examined in some details the growth experience of South Asia since its independence from 
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There has been much debate in the region as to how far the higher rate of growth 
has translated into a better life for the people at large, which is after all the essence of 
inclusive growth. Let us begin by examining the evolution of inequality (Table 2), which 
as I have noted earlier has to be an essential attribute of inclusive growth, even though 
the inclusiveness of growth cannot be judged fully by the short-run equity outcome of a 
growth  process.  In  undertaking  this  examination,  I  shall  pay  special  attention  to  the 
possible contrasts between what happened before and after the major economic reforms 
were launched.  
Table 2 
Trend of Inequality in South Asia (Gini coefficient) 
Country/Year  National  Rural  Urban  Estate 
India     
  1983  38.6  30.79  34.06  n.a. 
  1993-94  38.0  28.55  34.31  n.a. 
  2004-05  38.5  30.45  37.51  n.a. 
Pakistan     
  1979  39.46  34.50  41.28  n.a. 
  1990-91  40.99  42.18  37.88  n.a. 
  2000-01  41.29  37.62  46.15  n.a. 
  2000-01  27.52  23.67  32.27  n.a. 
  2004-05  29.76  25.19  33.88  n.a. 
Bangladesh     
  1983/84  52.3  53.8  40.9  n.a. 
  1991/92  49.7  52.9  33.6  n.a. 
  1991/92  58.8  61.2  44.9  n.a. 
  2000  48.9  52.3  35.2  n.a. 
  2005  40  43.8  28.4  n.a. 
Sri Lanka     
  1985/86  46.0  48.0  43.0  31.0 
  1990/91  47.0  62.0  42.0  25.0 
  1995/96  46.0  47.0  46.0  34.0 
  1990/91  32.0  37.0  29.0  22.0 
  1995/96  35.0  38.0  33.0  20.0 
  2002  40.0  42.0  39.0  26.0 
Notes and Sources: For India, Das (2008) for all-India and Dev and Ravi (2007, Table 3) for Rural and Urban 
(all based on consumption data); for Pakistan, Anwar (2005) for the upper panel (based on 
income  data)  and  Anwar  (2006)  for  the  lower  panel  (based  on  consumption  data);  for 
Bangladesh, BBS (2005) for the upper panel and Khan (2008) for the lower panel (both 
based on income data); for Sri Lanka, Nicholas, et al. (2004) for the upper panel (based on 
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In India, overall inequality appears to have remained static in the two decades 
since the mid-1980s, with the Gini coefficient of per capita consumption expenditure 
hovering  around  0.38-0.39.  This  apparent  stability  in  overall  inequality  has  been 
accompanied, however, by rising inequality in both rural and urban areas in recent times. 
In the pre-reform decade between 1983 and 1993-94 the Gini coefficient had declined in 
rural areas and remained static in urban areas. But during the post-reform period (1993-
94 to 2004-05), it has risen in both rural and urban areas. The fact that the overall Gini 
coefficient at the all-India level has hardly changed at all during this period suggests that 
the disparity between urban and rural areas has declined and that this decline has been 
sufficient  to  offset  the  rise  in  within-sector  inequality.
3  If,  however,  one  examines 
measures of inequality other than the Gini coefficient, there are some indications that 
overall inequality may have increased slightly during the post-reform period.
4 
The Pakistan scenario is somewhat similar to that of India. For the country as a 
whole, inequality was quite stable in the 1980s as well as in the 1990s, with the Gini 
coefficient of per capita income distribution staying close to 0.40. As in the case of India, 
both rural and urban inequality increased during these two decades but their effect on 
overall  inequality  appears  to  have  been  mitigated  by  the  narrowing  of  urban-rural 
disparity. This pattern has changed, however, after the turn of the century. In the short 
space  of  four  years  (from  2000-01  to  2004-05),  the  Gini  coefficient  of  per  capita 
consumption distribution has gone up by two percentage points—from 0.28 to 0.30. Both 
rural and urban inequality have also increased but slightly less than overall inequality, 
suggesting a reversal of the past trend of narrowing urban-rural disparity. 
The picture is very different in Sri Lanka, however. Overall inequality seems to have 
risen sharply since 1990 after remaining more or less stable in the second half of the 1980s. 
The Gini coefficient of per capita consumption distribution has increased steadily from 0.32 in 
1990-91 to 0.35 in 1995-96 and further to 0.40 in 2002. In the urban areas the Gini coefficient 
has risen from 0.37 in 1990-91 to 0.42 in 2002, in rural areas it has risen from 0.29 to 0.39 
during the same period and in the estate sector it has gone up from 0.22 to 0.26. Sri Lanka has 
thus witnessed sharp and pervasive increase in inequality during the post-1990 period. 
Bangladesh,  like  Sri  Lanka,  has  also  experienced  sharply  rising  inequality. 
Already in the 1980s inequality was on a rising trend but only mildly so, as the Gini 
coefficient  increased  by  just  three  percentage  points  between  1983-84  and  1991-92. 
However, since then the Gini coefficient has gone up rapidly—from 0.30 in 1991-92 to 
0.41  in  2000.  What  has  happened  since  2000  remains  somewhat  unclear.  Official 
estimates of inequality show remarkable stability in inequality during 2000-2005, even 
suggesting,  quite  implausibly,  that  inequality  has  fallen  in  urban  areas.  On  careful 
examination of the income data used by the official estimates, a recent study has cast 
doubt on their plausibility and after making suitable adjustments have come out with 
revised  estimates  which  show  that  inequality  has  continued  to  rise  after  2000—both 
nationally and within urban and rural areas separately [Khan (2008)].  
3This contrast between ‘within-sector’ and ‘between-sector’ inequality will be discussed more fully in 
the next section. 
4One  such  alternative  measure—viz.  logarithmic  mean  deviation—shows  that  reduced  disparity 
between urban and rural sectors has not fully offset the rise in inequality within rural and urban areas; as a result 
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The pattern for the region as a whole thus seems to contain two distinct strands. In 
India and Pakistan, inequality had remained more or less stable in the 1980s and the 
1990s  but  has  risen  mildly  since  then.  In  Sri  Lanka  and  Bangladesh,  by  contrast, 
inequality increased sharply in the 1990s and has remained on the rising trend afterwards. 
The overall trend for the region as a whole is one of rising inequality in the present 
decade. 
We thus find that in the region as a whole faster rate of growth achieved in the 
recent past has been accompanied by rising inequality. What has been the consequence of 
this ‘higher growth higher inequality’ scenario for the pace of poverty reduction? Table 3 
provides the answer.  
Table 3 
Trend of Poverty in South Asia (Headcount Ratio; %) 
Country/Year  National  Rural  Urban  Estate 
India     
1983  44.93  45.76  42.27  n.a. 
1993-94  36.02  37.26  32.56  n.a. 
2004-05  28.27  29.18  26.02  n.a. 
Pakistan     
1979  30.68  32.51  25.94  n.a. 
1990-91  22.11  23.59  18.64  n.a. 
2000-01  33.30  37.90  22.00  n.a. 
2004-05  28.30  32.90  18.40  n.a. 
Bangladesh     
1983-84  52.3  53.8  40.9  n.a. 
1991-92  49.7  52.9  33.6  n.a. 
1991-92  58.8  61.2  44.9  n.a. 
2000  48.9  52.3  35.2  n.a. 
2005  40.0  43.8  28.4  n.a. 
Sri Lanka     
1985-86  41.0  46.5  25.7  30.0 
1990-91  29.5  32.3  22.0  23.3 
1995-96  36.0  38.0  22.4  41.1 
1990-91  26.1  29.4  16.3  20.5 
1995-96  28.8  30.9  14.0  38.4 
2002  22.7  24.7  7.9  30.0 
Sources:  For India, Dev and Ravi (2007), Table 1; For Pakistan, Amjad and Kemal (1997) for data on 1979 and 
1990-91, and World Bank (2006) for 2000-01 and 2004-05; for Bangladesh, Osmani, et al. (2006), 
Table  II.1  for  the  upper  panel  and  World  Bank  (2007a)  for  the  lower  panel;  for  Sri  Lanka, 
Gunewardene  (2000) [as  quoted  in Nicholas, et  al. (2004)] for the  upper panel  and World  Bank 
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After remaining recalcitrant for nearly two decades since independence, poverty 
began to decline in India in the 1970s, thanks mainly to rising productivity in agriculture 
brought about by the Green Revolution. As the initial impetus of the Green Revolution 
has gradually weakened, the pace of poverty reduction has been sustained by more broad-
based progress in the economy as a whole. In the early 1980s, when economic reforms 
had just begun in India, nearly half of the population still lived in poverty; in the next two 
decades and a half the proportion has come down to less than one-third. Thus, the rate of 
poverty  fell  from 45  percent  in  1983  to  28  percent  in  2004-05.  Contrary  to  popular 
misconception, both rural and urban areas have shared in this reduction of poverty. Rural 
poverty, which has traditionally been higher than urban poverty, has come down from 46 
percent in 1983 to 29 percent in 2004-05. Urban poverty at the same time has fallen from 
42 percent to 26 percent. 
There has been a lively debate in India on whether the pace of poverty reduction 
gathered momentum or slowed down after a set of wide-ranging economic reforms was 
adopted in the early 1990s to launch the Indian economy onto a higher growth path. A 
consensus has gradually emerged that the pace had actually slowed down in the 1990s 
compared with the preceding decade but has picked up strongly after the turn of the 
century.
5 The question still remains, however, whether the pace of poverty reduction has 
been commensurate with the historically unprecedented high rates of growth achieved by 
India in the recent years. This question lies at the heart of the theme of inclusive growth 
that this paper is concerned with and we shall return to it after taking a brief look at the 
evolution of poverty in some of the other South Asian countries. 
The Sri Lankan experience has some similarity with that of India insofar as a 
healthy rate of poverty reduction in the 1980s gave way to a much slower pace after 
1990, followed by a late revival. The difference, however, is that the recent revival has 
not been nearly as strong as that of India. In the second half of the 1980s, poverty had 
declined by as much as 10 percentage points in the country as a whole, but in the 12 years 
since 1990 it fell by just three percentage points. In fact, there was a reversal in the first 
half of the 1990s, when poverty actually went up unlike in India where poverty continued 
to decline albeit slowly. It was only a healthy decline since 1995-96 that allowed the 
poverty situation at the turn of the century to remain somewhat better than a decade 
earlier. 
In yet another contrast with India, the process of poverty reduction has not been 
widespread in Sri Lanka. It is the urban areas that have benefited most, with the rate of 
urban poverty almost halving from an already low level of 16 percent in 1990-91 to 8 
percent in 2002. By contrast, rural poverty fell only slowly from 29 percent to 25 percent 
during the same period, while poverty in the Estates actually increased quite sharply— 
from 21 percent to 30 percent. 
The Pakistan experience has been somewhat similar to Sri Lanka’s, except that the 
setback that occurred after 1990 lingered much longer. The decade of the 1980s had 
witnessed substantial and widespread reduction of poverty, with national poverty falling 
from 31 percent in 1979 to 22 percent in 1990-91. Then came the lost decade of the 
1990s,  and  poverty  jumped  to  33  percent  by  2000-01,  exceeding  the  rate  that  had  
5For a sample of the literature, see, for example, Deaton and Dreze (2002), Sundaram and Tendulkar 
(2003), Sen and Himanshu (2004a, 2004b), Himanshu (2008) and Dev and Ravi (2008). S. R. Osmani  388
prevailed a couple of decades ago. It seemed at the turn of the century that the clock had 
turned back in Pakistan, perhaps irretrievably. Fortunately, things turned around soon 
afterwards as poverty declined by 5 percentage points by 2004-05.
6 
Considering the two decades and a half since 1979, the overall poverty situation 
has slightly improved in Pakistan, thanks to the late push that came at the turn of the 
century. But there has been hardly any change in rural poverty—nearly a third of the rural 
population lived in poverty in 1979 and almost the same proportion of them continued to 
do so in 2004-05. Only the urban population have enjoyed the benefit of reduced poverty, 
as  urban  poverty  has  fallen  from  26  percent  in  1979  to  18  percent  in  2004-05—a 
phenomenon that Pakistan shares with Sri Lanka but not with India. 
Bangladesh  has  been  somewhat  of  an  exception  in  the  region  in  terms  of  the 
evolution  of  poverty.  Unlike  the  other  three  countries,  Bangladesh  has  experienced 
accelerating pace of poverty reduction since 1990, embracing both rural and urban areas. 
In the 1980s, poverty had declined very slowly, falling only by a couple of percentage 
points during 1983-84-1991-92, and that too was confined mostly in urban areas. This is 
in sharp contrast with the rest of the region where poverty declined at quite a healthy pace 
in  the  1980s.  Since  1990,  however,  the  pace  of  poverty  reduction  has  gathered 
momentum in Bangladesh, in contrast to the slowdowns or reversals in the rest of the 
region. According to official estimates, poverty in the country as a whole came down 
from 59 percent in 1991-92 to 49 percent in 2000 and it fell further to 40 percent by 
2005. As in India, both rural and urban areas have enjoyed  substantial reductions in 
poverty, with rural poverty coming down from 61 percent in 1991-92 to 44 percent in 
2005 and urban poverty coming down from 45 percent to 28 percent during the same 
period. 
In summary, a large part of the region, comprising India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
experienced a setback in the fight against poverty in some parts of the 1990s—in the 
form of slowdown of progress in India and increased poverty in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. 
Fortunately, recent years have witnessed a revival in each of these countries, with India 
leading the way. Bangladesh has been an exception in this regard, by maintaining an 
accelerated pace of poverty reduction all throughout the period since 1990. Taking all 
four countries together, the region as a whole can be said to have witnessed quickening 
pace of poverty reduction in the present decade as compared with the early 1990s. 
So far, we have looked at the record of growth, inequality and poverty in isolation 
of each other. We now bring them together in order to make an initial assessment of the 
inclusiveness of growth (Table 4). 
As we have noted earlier, India has had a faster rate of growth in the post-reform 
period, with per capita GDP growing at the rate of 4.2 percent during 1993-94-2004-05 as 
compared with 3.3 percent in the preceding decade. And yet, poverty declined almost 
exactly at the same rate in both periods—at about 2.2 percent per annum. Since faster 
growth in the post-reform period did not translate into faster reduction of poverty, the 
natural inference would be that distribution must have worsened. As it happens, however, 
the Gini coefficient does not reveal any such worsening. This may be because Gini is 
a summary  measure  of the  overall  distribution  and  it is entirely plausible that  any   
6These figures are taken from World Bank (2006); other independent estimates arrive at similar figures 
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Table 4 







India    
1983 to 1993-94  3.32  0  –2.19 
1993-94 to 2004-05  4.23  0  –2.18 
Pakistan    
1979 to 1990-91  3.34  0.35  –2.93 
1990-91 to 2000-01  1.53  0.07  4.18 
2000-01 to 2004-05  3.97  1.98  –3.99 
Bangladesh    
1983-84 to 1991-92  1.75  1.01  –0.64 
1991-92 to 2000  3.50  3.47  –2.15 
2000 to 2005  4.30  3.50  –3.94 
1991/92 to 2005  3.64  2.77  –2.81 
Sri Lanka    
1985-86 to 1990-91  2.69  0.43  –6.36 
1990-91 to 1995-96  3.98  1.81  1.99 
1995-96 to 2002  2.88  2.08  –3.60 
1990-91 to 2002  3.21  1.96  –1.21 
Source: GDP figures were compiled from national statistics; Gini coefficients and poverty rates are taken from 
Tables 2 and 3 above.  
worsening of distribution at the lower tail (which is what matters for poverty) was offset 
by improvement in the middle of the distribution. Besides, as mentioned earlier, measures 
other than the Gini coefficient do indicate some deterioration in distribution in the post-
reform period. Looking at more recent years one finds that in the five-year period 2000-
2005 growth has accelerated even further and so has the pace of poverty reduction, even 
though  inequality  has  increased  mildly.  India’s  overall  experience  in  the  post-reform 
period is thus one of faster growth being accompanied by faster rate of poverty reduction 
in the more recent period along with mild increase in inequality. 
In Pakistan, the relationship between growth, poverty and inequality has gone 
through three distinct phases since 1980. In the decade of the 1980s, healthy decline 
in poverty was accompanied by an equally healthy growth of per capita income and 
only  a  mild  increase  in  inequality.  But  poverty  increased  in  the  1990s,  primarily 
because of a drastic fall in the rate of growth, with inequality playing only a minor 
role. Happily, the decline of poverty resumed after 2000, but the pattern was very 
different from the earlier episode of declining poverty (in the 1980s). This time very 
sharp increase in inequality went hand in hand with rapid decline in poverty. It was 
only  a  very  rapid  growth  of  income  that  made  possible  a  rapid  rate  of  poverty 
reduction despite very sharp increase in inequality. Thus, as in the case of India, in 
Pakistan too faster growth has translated into more rapid poverty reduction in recent 
years, despite the fact that the rise in inequality has been much sharper in Pakistan 
than in India. S. R. Osmani  390
The  Bangladesh  scenario  is  essentially  similar,  except  that  what  has  been 
happening in India and Pakistan since about 2000 has been happening there for somewhat 
longer—since about 1990. In the 1980s, growth was slow and so was the rate of poverty 
reduction. When growth accelerated in the 1990s, so did the rate of poverty reduction but 
accompanied by a very considerable increase in inequality. 
Sri Lanka on the other hand has had a completely contrasting experience. Despite 
faster growth since 1990, poverty declined at a much slower rate compared with the 
second  half  of  the  1980s.  This  disjunction  between  growth  and  poverty  reduction  is 
accounted for by the fact that the rate of increase in inequality has accelerated from 0.43 
percent to 2.0 percent per annum during the same period. In other words, faster increase 
in inequality has prevented faster growth from translating itself into faster reduction of 
poverty. 
A common phenomenon in the region is that as growth accelerated in recent years 
not  only  has  inequality  increased  but  has  done  so  at  a  faster  rate  than  before.  Also 
common is the fact that rising inequality has nowhere been strong enough to actually 
aggravate poverty by neutralising the effect of growth. The difference, however, lies in 
the pace of poverty reduction. The most adverse effect was observed in Sri Lanka where 
the  pace  of  poverty  reduction  slowed  down  despite  faster  growth.  By  contrast,  in 
Bangladesh  and  Pakistan,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  India,  faster  growth  has  been 
accompanied by faster reduction of poverty despite rising inequality. 
What does all this say about the nature of the growth process in the region? There 
is one indisputable fact on which everyone can agree—namely, that growth has been 
unequalising in nature all over the region. Has this tendency towards rising inequality had 
an adverse effect on poverty? This is a much trickier question to answer. On the basis of 
the kind of data presented above, one could claim that there was ostensibly an adverse 
effect in Sri Lanka but not in Bangladesh, Pakistan and India where poverty declined at a 
faster rate in the milieu of high growth and high inequality. But even for the latter three 
countries, it can be argued, and has been argued quite often, that rising inequality has had 
an adverse effect on poverty in the sense that but for higher inequality the pace of poverty 
reduction  would  have  been  faster  still.  The  literature  is  rife  with  numerical 
demonstrations of how much lower poverty would have been if inequality had remained 
unchanged during the period of rapid growth. 
These numerical exercises are not particularly meaningful, however. The problem 
lies not in the arithmetic, though. To say that poverty would have declined by certain 
percentage points more had inequality remained the same would be arithmetically true, 
provided one gets one’s sums right. But the relevant issue is how useful such statements 
are in throwing light on the options available to a society. These exercises compare the 
actual situation with a counterfactual in which the actual growth rate is allowed to prevail 
but actual inequality is replaced by some base level inequality. In other words, while the 
counterfactual allows the growth rate to evolve in the way it actually did during the 
period in question, it does not allow inequality to evolve at all. The question is: can such 
a counterfactual be claimed to be a feasible option available to the society? If the answer 
is yes, then the numerical exercises are meaningful; otherwise they are not. 
To claim, however, on purely a priori grounds, that the designed counterfactual is 
feasible is to imply that the level of inequality can be fixed independently of the rate of Demands of Inclusive Growth  391
growth. But in practice this may not be possible. Both the rate of growth and the level of 
inequality  are  determined  endogenously  through  the  growth  process.  By  influencing  the 
growth process, different policy regimes may lead to different outcomes in terms of growth 
and inequality. Thus, for every society there will exist a set of feasible combinations of growth 
and inequality it can in principle achieve. But there is no priori reason to believe that this 
feasible  set  will  necessarily  contain  the  particular  combination  that  the  counterfactual 
assumes—namely,  the  achieved  rate  of  growth  combined  with  the  unchanged  level  of 
inequality.  Therefore,  the  numerical  exercises  purporting  to  show  the  effect  of  rising 
inequality on poverty, despite being arithmetically valid, are practically irrelevant. 
The really important task is to try and understand the growth process so as to 
come  to  a  judgement  on  whether  an  alternative  growth  process  could  have  been 
induced  by  policy  interventions  so  that  the  resulting  combination  of  growth  and 
inequality would have yielded a better outcome in terms of poverty. Such an enquiry 
could conceivably lead to the conclusion that there was no feasible growth process 
that would have bettered the outcome that has actually been achieved. In that case, an 
actual increase in inequality should not be a cause for concern as far as the objective 
of poverty reduction is concerned. Of course, equality is a valued goal in itself and 
from this perspective one may still be concerned with rising inequality and search for 
an  alternative  growth  process  that  leads  to  lower  inequality  even  if  the  resulting 
combination of growth and inequality makes for slower reduction of poverty. In this 
case, however, one would be confronted with a trade-off between the objectives of 
equality and poverty reduction, but so long as the society is aware of this trade-off 
and deals with it in accordance of the value judgements of the society at large this 
does not pose any problem in principle. 
Alternatively, it’s also possible that the enquiry could successfully identify feasible 
alternatives in which the poverty outcome could indeed be bettered either by raising the 
growth rate, or by reducing inequality or by a combination of the two. Identification of 
such alternatives and the policy measures that might help achieve those alternatives ought 
to be the primary focus of any analysis of inclusive growth. We cannot hope to attempt, 
let alone accomplish, this task within the confines of the present lecture, but we offer 
some reflections based on some fragmentary evidence in the following section.  
III.  REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE GROWTH  
PROCESS IN SOUTH ASIA 
There is widespread agreement that the growth process that has recently launched 
India on to a higher growth path has been unequalising in nature. In order to gain a 
clearer understanding of the precise nature of the growth process, it will be instructive to 
examine the sources of rising inequality. An important insight in this respect is provided 
by a decomposition exercise carried out by Das (2008), in which aggregate inequality 
was  broken  up  into  two  components—one  component  measuring  inequality  between 
groups and the other component measuring inequality within groups. For this purpose, 
various  kinds  of  groupings  were  considered—for  example,  urban  and  rural  sectors, 
different occupational groups, a number of socio-religious groups, and the states of India. 
Inequality  was  measured  by  the  mean  logarithmic  deviation  of  per  adult  equivalent 
household expenditure. The results are reported in Table 5. S. R. Osmani  392
Table 5 








Urban/Rural Sector    
1983  216  96  4 
1993-94  179  87  13 
2004-05  185  90  10 
Occupational Groups    
1983  NA  NA  NA 
1993-94  179  77  23 
2004-05  185  82  18 
Socio-religious Groups    
1983  216  96  4 
1993-94  179  90  10 
2004-05  185  91  9 
States    
1983  216  95  5 
1993-94  179  90  10 
2004-05  185  89  11 
Forward/Backward States    
1983  216  99  1 
1993-94  179  96  4 
2004-05  185  95  5 
Refined Groups    
1983  216  91  9 
1993-94  179  78  22 
2004-05  185  80  20 
Source:  Das (2008), Table 5.2. 
Notes:   (1)  Inequality  is  measured  by  Mean  Logarithmic  Deviation  of  per  adult  equivalent  household 
expenditure. 




forward/backward states.  
The  first  point  to  note  is  that,  whatever  grouping  is  considered,  within-group 
inequality  accounts  for  an  overwhelming  proportion  of  aggregate  inequality,  the 
contribution of between-group inequality being relatively minor. Second, according to the 
measure  used  by  Das,  aggregate  inequality  declined  considerably  between  1983  and 
1993-94 but has gone up somewhat since then. This is the statistical basis of our earlier 
observation that the post-reform growth process has been unequalising in nature. The 
question we now ask is which of the two components had contributed more to the falling 
inequality in the 1980s and which component contributed more to rising inequality in the 
post-reform era. Demands of Inclusive Growth  393
The answer in both cases is within-group inequality. Thus, considering the urban-
rural division, the share of within-group inequality had fallen from 96 percent in 1983 to 
87 percent in 1993-94 but rose to 90 percent in 2004-05. Similarly, looking at the socio-
religious groups, the share of within-group inequality had fallen from 96 percent to 90 
percent during the pre-reform era but crawled back to 91 percent in the post-reform era. 
For the occupational groups too, it is the rising share of within-group inequality that 
accounts  for  the  overall  rise  in  inequality  after  1993-94.  The  only  exception  to  this 
pattern  is  found  with  respect  to  the  states,  especially  to  the  binary  division  between 
forward and backward states, for which the share of within-group inequality has fallen in 
the  post-reform  era  and  that  of  between-group  inequality  has  risen.  However,  if  one 
disaggregates further and considers finer groupings such as socio-religious groups living 
in either urban or rural areas in either forward or backward states, then once again the 
share of within-group inequality appears to have risen after 1993-94. 
Thus it is fair to conclude that it is the widening of within-group inequality rather 
than between-group inequality that accounts for recent widening of inequality in India. In 
other words, what has suffered more in the post-reform period is vertical equity rather 
than horizontal equity. Thus the post-reform growth process seems to have benefited 
most groups of people more or less equally, but within each group some have benefited 
less than others. This is what has made the growth process more unequal in recent years.  
Something very similar seems to have happened in Pakistan. A recent study of 
earnings inequality among different occupation groups shows that while within-group 
inequality has widened sharply since the early 1990s, between-group inequality may have 
been narrowing in recent years [Sadiq and Akhtar (2006)]. As can be seen from Table 6, 
the Gini coefficient of earnings within each of the occupation groups jumped sharply in 
the 1990s and the upward trend has continued afterwards. Thus, while in 1992-93 the 
Gini coefficients ranged between 0.18 and 0.27, by 2005 all of them were found between 
0.41  and  0.46.  This  amounts  to  a  spectacular  rise  in  inequality  indeed.  However, 
comparison across occupation groups shows that disparity in their mean incomes may 
have narrowed somewhat in the first half of this decade.
7 Thus, as in the case of India, the 
recent growth process in Pakistan seems to have given broadly similar opportunities to all 
occupation groups but very unequal opportunities to individuals within each group.   
Table 6 
Earnings Inequality within Occupation Groups in Pakistan 
Occupation  1992-93  2000-01  2004-05 
Senior Executives and Legislators  27.3  40.6  44.3 
Professionals  13.6  39.4  44.2 
White Collar Workers  26.5  38.1  42.1 
Technicians  21.7  40.0  46.0 
Other Skilled Workers  29.9  43.7  44.7 
Elementary Occupations  18.0  35.8  41.1 
Overall  –  43.4  45.7 
Source: Sadiq and Akhtar (2006), Table 1.  
7Thus, the coefficient of variation in the earnings of employees in the occupation groups came down 
from 0.90 in 2000-01 to 0.72 in 2004-05, while the coefficient of variation for the self-employed workers 
remained stable at around 0.60 (calculated from the information provided in Appendix B of Sadiq and Akhtar, 
2006).  We  do  not  have  corresponding  information  for  1992-93  with  which  to  assess  how  between-group 
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For Sri Lanka we also draw upon a decomposition exercise but of a different kind 
from the one we used for India. Here aggregate inequality is broken up not among groups 
of people or households but among the determinants of household income, especially the 
ones  that  can  be  treated  as  policy  variables  such  as  education  and  infrastructure 
[Gunatilaka and Chotikapanich (2005)]. For this purpose, the authors first estimate an 
income-generating function by regressing income on a set of determinants and then apply 
the Shapely value decomposition technique to apportion total inequality to each of the 
determinants of income. 
The results of this decomposition exercise show that income flows associated with 
access to infrastructure, education and with the nature of occupation were the principal 
determinants of inequality and the main drivers of the change in income distribution in 
Sri Lanka. Moreover, the contribution of income flows from education and infrastructure 
to the change in inequality appears to have increased over the years (Table 7). In other 
words,  growing  inequality  is  explained  mainly  by  growing  disparity  in  households’ 
access to education and infrastructure.  
Table 7 
Factor Contribution to Inequality in Sri Lanka 
Determinants of Income  1980–85  1995–2002 
Adult Male  1.82  –11.83 
Adult Female  10.58  –15.33 
Ethnicity  9.71  –3.52 
Education  17.19  37.74 
Occupation  9.05  –7.88 
Infrastructure  42.56  112.38 
Spatial Dummy  –28.06  7.20 
Residual  6.50  –47.62 
Change in Gini  3.74  5.39 
Gunatilaka and Chotikapanich (2005), Table 5.  
Interestingly, in a related exercise the same two variables were also found to be the 
main drivers behind the rightward shift of the entire income distribution [Gunatilaka, et 
al. (2006)]. This means that the same policy variables that were primarily responsible for 
widespread  income  growth  were  also  responsible  for  widening  inequality.  While  the 
government policy of improving education and infrastructure has paid rich dividends in 
the form of higher growth of household income, the same policy has also led to wider 
inequality as the lower middle classes and middle classes benefited disproportionately 
more from state provision of education and infrastructure. 
We now examine the Bangladesh case through the lens of yet another type of 
decomposition  exercise.  Here  inequality  is  broken  up  into  contributions  that  can  be 
attributed  to  various  components  of  household  income—such  as  income  from  self-
employment  in  agriculture,  wage  employment,  non-farm  income,  remittances,  etc.  A 
number of recent studies have carried out such decomposition exercises with the help of a 
common methodology [Khan and Sen (2001); Khan (2006, 2008); Osmani, et al. (2006); 
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known as pseudo-Gini) for each component of income, which allows total inequality to 
be broken up into inequality in each of the components. The results then enable one to 
see which components of income have been mainly responsible for observed changes in 
overall inequality. 
A couple of findings stand out prominently from these studies (Table 8). First, 
three components of income have exerted the most unequalising influence on household 
income distribution in both rural and urban areas—namely, self-employment in non-farm 
enterprises,  salaried  wage  employment  (as  distinct  from  casual  employment),  and 
remittance  income,  especially  foreign  remittance  coming  from  Bangladeshi  migrants 
working abroad. Second, the share of these components in total income has gone up in 
the post-1990 period and so has the degree of inequality with which they are distributed. 
As a result, the contribution of each of these three components to overall inequality has 
increased during the 1990s and beyond, i.e., the unequalising components have become 
even more unequalising over time. It is the latter fact that accounts for rising inequality in 
Bangladesh. 
The important point to note here is that these three components of income are also 
the very ones that played a critical role in accelerating the pace of both economic growth 
and poverty reduction in Bangladesh in the post-1990 period. Of the three, the role of 
remittance in Bangladesh economy has been particularly well documented. By the middle 
of  the  present  decade  nearly  one  percent  of  the  country’s  labour  force  was  working 
abroad sending remittances worth about 8 percent of GDP. During 2000-07, remittances 
have provided two and a half times as much resources as foreign aid and more than a 
quarter  of  all  foreign  exchange  earnings,  and  have  amounted  to  about  a  quarter  of 
national savings and investment. In addition to augmenting resources on the supply side, 
remittances  have  also  boosted  aggregate  demand,  thereby  stimulating  production, 
especially  of  non-tradables.  Clearly,  the  growth  acceleration  that  Bangladesh  has 
experienced since 1990 owes a great deal to the flow of remittances. At the same time, 
from tiny  beginnings  remittances have now  come  to  account for  nearly  8  percent  of 
average household income. As most of the migrant workers belong to the bottom half of 
the population, the contribution of remittance to poorer households would be even higher. 
This has no doubt played an important part in accelerating the pace of poverty reduction 
in recent years.  
As for the significance of the other two components—viz., non-farm income and 
salaried employment—for growth and poverty reduction in Bangladesh, we may draw 
upon  the analysis of Osmani,  et al. (2006). They have demonstrated that the growth 
acceleration of the 1990s owed itself primarily to the rapid growth of the non-tradable 
non-farm sector, which in turn owed itself to enhanced domestic demand.
8 Faster growth 
enabled  the  non-farm  enterprises  to  increase  their  scale  of  operation,  thus  tilting  the 
structure of the non-farm sector more towards relatively large enterprises. This structural 
change in turn brought about a change in the nature of labour absorption in this sector, as 
salaried  wage  employment  became  more  plentiful  with  the  emergence  of  larger 
enterprises. Whereas in the 1980s most of the surplus labour that got absorbed in the non-
farm  sector  found  their way into low-productivity self-employment type of activities, in   
8The stimulus to domestic demand emanated initially from the crop sector and but increasingly from 
foreign remittances and the earnings of workers engaged in the readymade garments sector. Table 8 
Decomposition of Inequality: Rural Bangladesh  
Share in Total Income (%)  Concentration Ratio  Contribution to Inequality (%) 
 
1991-92  2000  2005  1991-92  2000  2005  1991-92  2000  2005          
29.98 
Farm Income  41.48  20.92  30.5  0.33  0.35  0.45  49.9  20.45  21.39 
Wage Income  21.42  31.17  28.1  0.1  0.21  0.28  7.9  18.28  –0.02 
  Casual Agricultural Labour
 
10.86  10.29  14.88  –0.11  –0.15  –0.001  –4.38  –4.31  
  Casual Non-agri. Labour  4.23  7.33   0.14  0.07   2.17  1.43  17.09 
  Salaried Non-agri. Labour  6.32  13.55  13.22  0.45  0.55  0.6  10.42  20.82  23.28 
Non-farm Enterprise  15.53  20.24  17.05  0.22  0.48  0.66  12.4  27.14  15.83 
Remittance   10.86  11.26   0.61  0.65   18.51  2.43 
   Internal   3.33  3.05   0.39  0.37   3.63  13.4 
   Foreign   7.33  8.21   0.71  0.75   14.93  2005 
Sources: Khan and Sen (2001) for 1991-92; Osmani, et al. (2006) for (2000) and Bhattacharya and Khan (2008) for 2005.   Demands of Inclusive Growth  397
the 1990s the absorption occurred more into salaried employment in the relatively larger 
and  more  productive  enterprises.  As  it  happens,  salaried  employment  in  larger  scale 
enterprises  is  far  more  rewarding  for  the  poor  than  self-employment  in  non-farm 
activities.
9 As a result, the structural change that was engendered by the growth process 
of the 1990s was especially conducive to poverty reduction. 
The upshot of the preceding argument is that faster growth, faster reduction of 
poverty and rising inequality that Bangladesh experienced in the post-1990 period are all 
organically linked through the growth process. The same forces that contributed to the 
acceleration of both growth and poverty reduction were also responsible for the widening 
of inequality. In essence, this is pretty much the same story that we have told for Sri 
Lanka—the forces that promoted growth and helped reduce poverty also induced higher 
inequality. 
To  summarise,  in  India  and  Pakistan  the  growth  process  seems  to  have  been 
inclusive enough to give most groups of people adequate opportunities for benefiting 
from  growth,  but  within  each  group  only  some  individuals  have  seized  those 
opportunities while others have not. This has aggravated within-group  inequality and 
thereby rendered the whole growth process unequalising in nature. In Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka, the very same forces that bestowed dynamism to the growth process also induced 
greater inequality because people had differential access to the endowments that would 
enable them to integrate with the most dynamic sectors. The result is that neither in India 
and  Pakistan  nor  in  Bangladesh  and  Sri  Lanka  growth  was  inclusive  enough,  as 
evidenced by the fact that even as poverty declined inequality increased.  
IV.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Since the growth process in South Asia has systematically pushed poverty and 
inequality  in  opposite  directions,  one  is  entitled  to  wonder  whether  there  exists  an 
inherent  trade-off  between  poverty  and  inequality  in  this  region.  This  is  a  sobering 
thought,  because  if  indeed  such  a  trade-off  were  to  exist  the  achievement  of  truly 
inclusive growth would become infeasible, since as noted earlier both pro-poorness and 
equity are essential features of inclusive growth. 
But before we allow pessimism to engulf us, let us pause for a while and ask why 
did poverty and inequality move in opposite directions? What exactly was the policy 
failure, if there was any? This question cannot be fully answered here, but our analysis 
suggests a clue. In a sense, the fundamental problem in all four countries was essentially 
the same. In each case, even though the growth process opened up plentiful opportunities 
for  most  groups  of  people  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  growth,  thereby  making  poverty 
reduction possible at an accelerated pace, in every group some individuals failed to link 
up with the growth process, thereby exacerbating inequality. In Bangladesh, inequality 
increased because only a subset of the poor people were able to take advantage of non-
farm  enterprise,  salaried  employment,  and  remittances—all  factors  that  were  directly 
involved with the dynamism of the growth process. Similarly, inequality increased in Sri 
Lanka because poor people had differential access to endowments such as education and  
9For instance, in 2000, the return to labour of very poor households was Taka 56 per day (per worker) 
in salaried employment in the non-farm sector as against Taka 38 in non-farm self-employment [Osmani, et al. 
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infrastructure that helped propel growth. In India and Pakistan, we don’t know exactly 
what the poor people had lack of access to, but we do know that belonging to a particular 
social or occupational group was not the problem because the growth process did satisfy 
reasonable degree of horizontal equity among groups. The problem was that within each 
group some individuals failed to integrate with the growth process even though other 
members of the group managed to do so. This is essentially the same problem that we 
described for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka—i.e., some of the poor people were unable to 
link up with the growth process.  
In an earlier analysis, I have described this inability to link up with the growth 
process as the ‘integrability’ problem [Osmani (2006)]. This is one of several problems 
that can cause a disjunction between growth and poverty reduction. Other problems that 
can  cause  similar  disjunction  are  structures  of  production  and  employment  that  may 
promote  growth  but do  not create  adequate  opportunities  for  poor workers  to  earn a 
higher return for their labour. Our analysis suggests that these other problems did not 
perhaps act as the binding constraint in South Asia because after all accelerated growth 
did lead to accelerated rate of poverty reduction. It is the integrability problem, facing a 
subset of the poor, which ensured that even as poverty declined inequality would rise. 
The solution lies in policy interventions that would enhance the endowments and skills 
that are needed for the poor people to integrate with the growth process better. Success of 
such interventions would ensure that as opportunities for advancement were opened up 
by a growth process the majority of poor people would be able to take advantage of them. 
When that happens, inequality will fall at the same time that poverty is reduced, which 
suggests that a trade-off between poverty and inequality may not exist in South Asia after 
all. Achievement of truly inclusive growth may thus yet be possible.  
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Madame Chairperson,  
Please allow me to thank the organisers of this session for inviting me to be a 
discussant on Dr Osmani’s paper at the last minute, at my own request. It was mainly for 
the sentimental reason that the author was among the first three batch of  students at the 
Islamabad University (now QAU), which consisted almost exclusively of students from 
then  East  Pakistan,  whom it  was  my  good  fortune  to  teach,  but  also  because  of  the 
thematic content  of his paper, which has been close to my heart ever since I got seriously 
interested in economics more than half a century ago. My purpose here is not take any 
credit for Professor Osmani’s academic achievement, for even at Islamabad University he 
probably  benefited  more  from  the  instruction  of  others,  especially  Prof.  Md.  Anisur 
Rehman, who established the Economics Department. 
Like Siddiqur Rehman, I also first went to LSE for my graduate studies. But LSE at 
that time had become a citadel of conservatism where development economics was taught as 
Economics of Tropical Countries, with a distinct colonial flavour. Osmani, however, was, like 
all succeeding   generations (and late developing countries),   much luckier and learnt his 
development economics from the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, who stimulated his interest in 
the economics of inequality, in which he became a leading authority in his own right very 
soon. He has sustained his interest in the subject over the years by working as a researcher at 
the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, the surgically-separated Siamese twin of 
PIDE, the UN World Institute of Development Economic Research (WIDER) and now as an 
academic in the UK. His paper reflects the maturity of his research ideas and perceptions and 
the pioneering and abiding influence of Professor Sen. 
Professor Akmal Hussain and Dr Rehana Siddiqui, who are several decades younger 
and wiser than me, have (will) do(ne) much more justice to the paper than I can—and (I am 
sure) they (will leave) have left little unsaid that (is) was worth saying, but I will nevertheless 
use this opportunity to reflect on the South Asian odyssey that Dr Osmani’s paper discusses in 
terms of growth rates, Gini coefficients and poverty headcount ratios. While the narrative 
brings out interesting contrasts between different pairs of countries and a certain pattern of 
uniformity among the four South Asian majors, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka,    
in terms of these variables, it would have been far more illuminating had he broadened the 
canvas to include a historical and cultural perspective, which South Asian countries share with 
each other. As the author candidly admits, “These numerical exercises are not particularly 
meaningful, however. The problem lies not in the arithmetic, though. And  further on he says: 
But the relevant issue is how useful such statements are in throwing light on the options 
available to a society”. 
However, within the confines of his self-imposed analytical boundaries, Professor 
Osmani has presented a masterful survey of the major trends in South Asia which have 
made the achievement of the goal of inclusive growth, in the sense of “the no child left 
behind”  paradigm  in  education,  difficult  to  achieve,  despite  progress  in  achieving 
substantially higher growth rates and reduction in headcount poverty ratios than in the 
1960s and 1970s. Dr Osmani attributes the improvement in growth performance of South 
Asia,  largely  to  the  “liberalising  reforms”  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  although  he 
acknowledges that other factors, such as higher agricultural productivity and remittances S. M. Naseem  402
played a contributing role. The latter two factors were probably more responsible for 
reduction in poverty. 
The paper’s main contribution is to bring inequality in income distribution to the centre 
of the debate, replacing poverty, alleviating  which has been the major concern in South Asia 
and  to a considerable extent that has been  assuaged by generally high growth rates since the 
1980s. Osmani comes to the startling surmise “that the growth process in South Asia has 
systematically pushed poverty and inequality in opposite directions” and that “there exists an 
inherent trade-off between poverty and inequality in this region”.  Although he tries to dispel 
the  disquietude  raised  by  his  conjecture  through  what  he  inadequately  explains  as  an 
“integrability”  problem  which  could  be  solved  through  “policy  interventions  that  would 
enhance the endowments and skills that are needed for the poor people to integrate with the 
growth process better”. He fails to elaborate how this problem can be overcome in South Asia, 
where  rent-seeking  and  well-entrenched  economic  and  social  groups  pre-empt  the 
opportunities created by the growth process and frustrate the realisation of “inclusive growth”. 
There is a need for addressing such structural issues as land reforms and access to human 
development capabilities more aggressively in South Asia. Countries and states within a 
country, which have paid greater attention to them such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, West 
Bengal and Kerala, seem to have reached the inclusive growth goal more closely than much 
of Northern India and Pakistan, which have considerably lagged behind in these efforts. 
Restructuring the industrial base and establishing linkages with the informal sector which 
provides the bulk of employment to the urban poor could also work towards that goal. 
Bangladesh’s  inspiring  example  in  improving  its  human  development  indicators  and  in 
moving rapidly from primary production to manufactures should be a beacon to its larger 
South Asian neighbours. 
However, the problem seems to be more fundamental than this and is embedded in 
the pattern of elitist growth common to most South Asian countries, which have been 
exacerbated by the liberalisation policies promoted by the IMF and World Bank and 
which have resulted in the almost complete withdrawal of the state from social sectors. 
While the developed world, in the wake of the current global economic crisis, is leaning 
heavily  towards  the  state  to  save  its  failing  banks  and  industrial  enterprises  and  to 
strengthen the  social safety networks by running trillion dollar deficits to finance fiscal 
stimulus packages, the developing countries are being asked to weather the storm without 
increasing their fiscal deficits. The optimism raised by high rates of growth and poverty 
reduction  in  South  Asia  since  1990,  documented  in  Dr  Osmani’s  paper  is  likely  to 
disappear in the coming decades as the impact of the prolonged world recession makes 
itself felt. There is, therefore, a need for more autonomous policymaking to protect the 
poor while reviving the modern sector, which usually receives the brunt of government 
attention during periods of recession. 
While making these somewhat critical comments, I fully appreciate the value of 
Professor Osmani’s paper in raising some important policy dilemmas facing South Asia.  
S. M. Naseem 
Quaid-i-Azam University 
Islamabad. 